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Abstract
Since the scalar product is the only internal structure of a Hilbert space, all
vectors of norm 1 are equivalent, in the sense that they form a perfect sphere in
the Hilbert space, on which every vector looks the same. The state vector of the
universe contains no information that distinguishes it from other state vectors of
the same Hilbert space.
If the state vector is considered as the only fundamental entity, the world is com-
pletely structureless. The illusion of interacting subsystems is due to a “bad” choice
of factorization (i.e. decomposition into subsystems) of the Hilbert space. There is
always a more appropriate factorization available in which subsystems don’t inter-
act and nothing happens at all. This factorization absorbs the time evolution of the
state vector in a trivial way. The Many Worlds Interpretation is therefore rather a
No World Interpretation.
A state vector gets the property of “representing a structure” only with respect to
an external observer who measures the state according to a specific factorization
and basis.
1 Introduction
The Everett Interpretation (EI, also known as Many Worlds) [1, 2, 3] is in a sense the
minimal interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM): It basically claims that only the
state vector |ψ〉 of the universe and the global Hamilton operator H are fundamental.
Everything else follows from the dynamics given by the Schro¨dinger equation. In par-
ticular, the state vector does not represent the state of some objects. It is the object
itself.
According to the EI, there is no mysterious collapse of the state vector, no hidden
variables, no split between a classical and a quantum realm (Heisenberg cut), no funda-
mental randomness. A measurement is - like many other processes - a process in which
a subsystem entangles with its environment. The dynamics is such that the global state
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vector is (roughly speaking) split into branches, one branch for each possible result a of
the measurement:
|Ψbefore〉 −→ |Ψafter〉 =
∑
a
ca|Ψa〉 (1)
Each branch then evolves independently, constituting a kind of “separate world” (hence
the name Many Worlds Interpretation). The split is, however, only an apparent one; in
fact the state vector remains a single state vector. This is a reason why |Ψ〉, in this
context, should not be considered as being the state vector of some separately existing
objects: These objects would really have to split when the state vector branches, and this
“ontological excess” would make the EI unattractive.
The EI is very attractive for several reasons:
• It makes a minimal number of assumptions, and postulates a minimal number of
entities (only H and |Ψ〉; the branches are not separate entities, they are parts of
|Ψ〉 and arise naturally through the dynamics).
• It demystifies the measurement process. A measurement is a quantum interaction
like anything else. This view is supported by the the theory of decoherence, which
shows that entanglement and branching are totally natural in interactions of a sub-
system with its environment.
• It is closer to our traditional understanding of science, because of its intrinsic de-
terminism and realism.
The EI also has a burden, which comes with the small number of assumptions and entities:
It needs to explain how the world that we experience emerges from it, in particular the
classical behavior on macroscopic scales on one hand and the appearance of probabilities
in quantum measurements on the other hand.
The two most serious and most discussed problems of the EI are these:
• How can the EI explain the observed probabilities in quantum measurements? I.e.,
why is the squared norm |ca|2 of a branch equivalent to the probability an observer
encounters for measuring the value a? If an observer performs the “same” (equiv-
alent) measurement many times, the state vector branches each time, and in the
end there will be a branch for each combined result of the measurements. Each
branch also contains one version of the observer. Each observer will conclude the
probability for each value a from the statistics of the individual results he got. One
can show that the norm of the part of the state vector corresponding to branches
where observers don’t get the right probabilities converges to zero when the number
of measurements is increased [2]. The remaining question is whether or not this
argument solves the problem (I think it does). In this paper, I will not deal with
the probability problem, so I won’t discuss this issue any further.
• The branching in eq.(1) occurs only with respect to a specific basis. How can we
determine this basis from the dynamics? This is refered to as the basis problem.
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The basis problem consists of two parts:
(A): How can the universe be split into subsystems appropriate to the measure-
ment? I.e., how can the measurement device M and the system S to be measured
be singled out within the global |Ψ〉? In other words: How can we split the global
Hilbert space H into a tensor product
H = HS ⊗HM ⊗ · · · (2)
such that the factors represent what we see as the “objects” of the measurement?
There are no “real” objects, but the apparent objects must be somehow justified as
properties of the evolving state vector.
(B): What is the basis of HS and HM along which the branching happens?
The second part is solved by decoherence [4, 5, 6]: Once the factorization into
subsystems has been done, the interactions of S with the environment (of which
M is a part) lead to branching according to a specific basis, and in each of these
branches, M will show a specific result.
The really tough part is (A). One purpose of this paper is to show that it is the
hard problem of the EI. I will refer to it as the factorization problem.
It is interesting that the factorization problem has received so little attention. Most
authors focused on the part of the basis problem which is solved by decoherence. Only
few authors have noticed that the factorization problem is a serious threat to the Everett
interpretation [3, 7, 8].
I think the reason is mainly that in almost all situations occuring in practice, the sub-
systems are already given (particles, cats, ...). The tensor product is considered bottom-
up, from the subsystems to the total system, not top-down, from the total system to the
deduction of an “appropriate” decomposition into subsystems.
Wallace [9] has claimed that the whole basis problem is not an issue, because it is not
necessary to specify a basis for the EI to work. The choice of a basis in QM is like the
choice of a sequence of spatial “constant time” hypersurfaces in General Relativity (GR).
It is up to the user to define such hypersurfaces in order to solve a problem. But the
physics of GR is independent of such a choice, and GR works without the requirement of
such a choice to be specified.
I totally agree with Wallace that the analogy should be valid if the EI works. The
only problem is that in GR there are frame-independent quantities, like the Ricci scalar,
or the square of the Riemann tensor. So we can, independently of a choice of coordinates,
decide whether two given manifolds have the same properties or not. The state vectors
in QM, however, are all equivalent. The only structure internal to H is its scalar
product. Taking only the state vectors of norm 1, there is no structure available to
distinguish them. They form a perfect complex sphere, and every vector looks the same.
This turns out to play a central role for the factorization problem, and to be a challenge
for the EI.
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I want to give two analogies to the argument I am presenting here:
1. Minkowski space:
As a vacuum solution of GR, Minkowski space describes an empty universe without cur-
vature in which nothing happens. It is described, in an appropriate coordinate frame, by
the line element
ds2 = −dt2 + dx2 + dy2 + dz2 (3)
But, using a different coordinate frame, we get the line element
ds2 = −dt˜ 2 + t˜ 2
(
dr˜2
1 + r˜2
+ r˜2dΩ2
)
. (4)
This is still Minkowski space, but in this frame it looks like it is an expanding universe
with negative spatial curvature. And of course we can construct much worse spatial
hypersurfaces, in which Minkowski space looks like there are all kinds of spatial structures
evolving in time.
I will call a frame like that of eq.(3) a Nirvana frame: a frame in which it is obvious
that nothing happens. A frame like that of (4) will be called Samsara frame: a frame in
which it looks like something happens, although in fact nothing happens1. My argument
will be that in the EI, bases which show a branching are just Samsara frames. We can
always find a Nirvana frame which shows that in fact nothing happened at all.
2. Classical Phase space:
In classical mechanics, Hamilton-Jacobi Theory tells us that for each system it is possi-
ble to find a canonical transformation such that the generalized position and momentum
variables Qi, Pi are constant. This constitutes a Nirvana frame of phase space. Nothing
ever happens in this frame. Every classical system has “Nirvana character” in such a
generalized phase space. If phase space were the only real thing, the fundamental stage
of physics, one may ask why one should ever consider coordinates different from those of
the peaceful Nirvana frame. But in classical mechanics, we use this generalized version of
phase space only as a tool to describe the motion of the real particles which move through
a three-dimensional space and have real positions qi and real momenta pi, and the gener-
alized Qi, Pi are useful only because we can express qi and pi as functions of them. Alone
and intrinsically the Qi, Pi have no meaning and cannot have one, because they describe,
in an appropriate frame, a universe in which nothing happens at all. I will argue that the
same is true for the state vector |Ψ〉 of the universe.
Section 2 contains an outline of the EI, and a list of things that need to be explained
from the dynamics of |Ψ〉 if it is really fundamental. The factorization problem and its
implications are discussed in detail.
In section 3 I will argue that |Ψ〉 per se (without the help of distinguished operators acting
on distinguished subspaces) contains no information at all, and that it is easy to choose
1These terms are used as a purely metaphoric analogy to certain ideas from Indian philosophy. I’m
not trying to suggest a real connection between physics and such a philosophy.
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a basis where |Ψ〉 describes a structureless universe in which nothing happens.
In section 4, a simple measurement process is discussed. It is shown that the branching
explanation of the process via entanglement and decoherence works only bottom up but
not top down. I.e., if a factorization of the Hilbert space is already given, we can describe
the interactions within that factorization (i.e. between the chosen subsystems) and get
a branching that happens in the full Hilbert space according to a preferred basis within
that factorization, the “decoherence basis”. But if one starts from the full Hilbert space
and the dynamics of the full state vector, it is possible to find a different factorization in
which there are no interactions at all between the new subsystems.
The conclusion (section 5) is that if |Ψ〉 were truely fundamental, choosing a basis in
which the world has a structure is like choosing a coordinate system in which Minkowski
space is an expanding universe. To render QM a senseful theory, one has to provide a
distinguished factorization of the Hilbert space, based on entities other than |Ψ〉. Or one
has to give up the idea of a universal |Ψ〉 altogether. Possibilities and consequences are
discussed.
Finally (section 6), the relation of the argument to other work in physics and philosophy
is discussed.
2 The Everett Interpretation and the factorization
problem
The postulates of QM provided by a typical textbook are:
1. The state of a quantum system S is described by ray of vectors in a complex Hilbert
space H. Usually one represents the state by a normalized element |Ψ〉 of the ray
(called the state vector), 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1.
2. To each physical observable belonging to S corresponds a hermitean operator A
acting on H. In a measurement
(a) the measured value λ is an eigenvalue of A;
(b) the state |ψ〉 of the system gets projected onto the eigenspace corresponding
to λ (“collapse”);
(c) the probability for obtaining λ is 〈ψ|Pλψ〉, where Pλ is the projection on the
eigenspace.
3. The time evolution of a state |ψ〉 is determined by a Schro¨dinger equation
i
d
dt
|ψ〉 = H|ψ〉 (5)
where H is the Hamilton operator representing the observable which measures the
system’s energy.
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The claim of the EI is essentially that only postulates 1 and 3 are fundamental, while
postulate 2 arises as a consequence of 1 and 3, on a subjective level, i.e. as the impression
gained by an observer performing a series of measurements.
The description of a measurement given by the EI is claimed to be as follows: A mea-
surement is a QM process that is completely covered by the dynamical evolution of the
state vector |Ψ〉 of system + measurement device + observer + environment, according
to the Schro¨dinger equation. (The Hilbert space in which this state vector lives is the
tensor product of the Hilbert spaces corresponding to each of the items). The Hamilton
operator contains interaction terms which enforce an entanglement of the system with
the measurement device, and further with the observer and the environment. As a con-
sequence, |Ψ〉 is (approximately, in an appropriate basis) split into several branches, i.e.
a sum of terms, where each term corresponds to one possible result of the measurement.
Each term contains the state of an observer who thinks he has projected the state of the
system according to a hermitean operator. But in fact, no projection has taken place,
only an entanglement, and the only hermitean operator acting was the global Hamilton
operator.
There are a number of things the EI has to explain if it is supposed to be the correct
stage for QM:
• Factorization:
How does the appearance of objects arise? I.e., why is it “natural” to factorize the
global Hilbert space into a tensor product of Hilbert spaces, such that each factor
makes sense to us as the Hilbert space of an object we can distinguish from the rest
of the “world”, where the “world” is an arrangement of many such objects. This
is the factorization problem mentioned in the Introduction. Given that there are
infinitely many possibilities to factorize a Hilbert space H (unless the dimension of
H is a prime number): Why is there a choice that is distinguished by describing
the “objects” of our “world”? The preferred choice must somehow arise from the
state vector and its dynamics. It must be a choice that lets the state vector or its
time evolution appear in a particularly simple way, or that lets the dynamics of the
chosen subsystems appear as independent as possible, or something alike.
Tensor factorizations can be constructed in the following way: If the dimension
of H is a finite number n = pq, choose a basis and label the basis vectors with
double indices, {|eij〉}, where i runs from 1 to p, j from 1 to q. Then write
|eij〉 = |fi〉 ⊗ |gj〉 (6)
and consider the {|fi〉} as a basis of subsystem S1, the {|gj〉} as a basis of subsystem
S2. This defines the subsystems. If p or q is non-prime, the factorization can be
continued. If the dimension of H is infinite, one or both of the indices can be chosen
to run from 1 to ∞. Some choices {|e(1)ij 〉} and {|e(2)ij 〉} are equivalent in the sense
that the transformation between them is only a transformation within S1 and S2
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separately, i.e. they both correspond to the same split of the entire system into two
subsystems, only the basis for those subsystems is different. But for most choices,
the split into an S1 and an S2 will be truely different. I will refer to {|eij〉} as the
factorization basis.
Are we allowed to choose the factorization in a time-dependent way? With
time-dependent {|eij(t)〉}? Since |Ψ〉 depends on time, and we are discussing subsys-
tems that arise as “meaningful” from its time dependent behavior, why should we
not allow these emerging subsystems to move their “position”/“orientation” within
the global Hilbert space? (With subsystems I mean the Hilbert space factors, not
the corresponding factors of the state vector.) This is also reasonable if one wants
to keep a certain equivalence between the pictures of QM. A picture is a vec-
tor identification map (VIM) that tells us which state vector in the Hilbert
space at time t2 is “equal” to a state vector in the Hilbert space at time t1. In the
Schro¨dinger picture, the state vector evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation;
in the Heisenberg picture, it does not evolve at all, i.e. the state vectors are identi-
fied along their trajectory. If a factorization is constant in the Schro¨dinger picture,
it will in general not be constant in the Heisenberg picture, and vice versa. Deutsch
[3], for example, in his approach to the EI, discusses everything in the Heisenberg
picture. His factorizations have to depend on time, because otherwise no entan-
glement could happen. The state vector is constant, so the only way how it can
represent the process of entanglement between interacting subsystems is when its
decomposition is not constant. If we want to keep the pictures on equal footing,
we should also allow for time dependent decompositions in the Schro¨dinger picture.
However, one may argue that in the EI, the Schro¨dinger picture is singled out: The
dynamics should happen in the state, not in the operators, because operators are
not fundamental [6]. Still, even when the Schro¨dinger picture is preferred, I don’t
see any principle that forbids subsystems to change their “position”/“orientation”
in the global Hilbert space.
Some comments about the time evolution of the subsystems’ states are in order.
The Hamilton operator (here for the generic case of an explicit time dependence)
can, for a given split into two subsystems, be decomposed
H(t) = H1(t)⊗ 1+ 1⊗H2(t) +Hint(t), (7)
and then, because there are infinitely many ways to write H(t) in such a form,
one may choose the one in which Hint(t) is, at each time, “minimal” in a certain
sense I will not specify any further. Again, this is an unusual task, because usually
the subsystems, their internal Hamilton operators and their interaction are already
given. Here, the decomposition of H(t) defines the interaction.
If (a) the factorization is constant, i.e. {|eij〉} does not depend on time, and if (b)
Hint(t)|Ψ(t)〉 is zero for some time interval, and if (c) |Ψ(t)〉 = |ψ1(t)〉 ⊗ |ψ2(t)〉
at the beginning of that time interval, then each subsystem state will evolve inde-
pendently according to a Schro¨dinger equation with Hamilton operators H1(t) and
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H2(t), respectively.
If the factorization is not constant, i.e. {|eij(t)〉} does depend on time, there may
still be time intervals in which the subsystem states evolve independently. The
evolution is still unitary, so each subsystem state will appear under the effect of a
Schro¨dinger equation. The corresponding “apparent” Hamilton operators, however,
are not the operators H1 and H2 of the decomposition (7) any more. Part
of the time dependence was brought in “by hand”, via the time dependence of the
factorization, and that part cannot be derived from the global Hamilton operator
H(t).
• Space:
How does the appearance of space arise? The state vector lives in an infinite or very
high dimensional complex Hilbert space. Why do the “objects” look like they are
layed out in a three-dimensional real space? Sure, the state |Ψ〉 was constructed
as a wave function Ψ(x1, · · · , x3n) (if we restrict ourselves to the QM of n scalar
particles moving in three dimensions for a moment); and the Hamilton operator
H was contructed in this spatial basis too, and is, with respect to its symmetries,
most clearly written in the spatial basis, i.e. written as an operator acting on wave
functions. The state vector will in general not have the same symmetries as H , just
as in general a solution to some equations of motion doesn’t have the symmetries
of the equations. (The symmetries of the equations are reflected as symmetries be-
tween different solutions, not as symmetries within one solution.) Basically |Ψ〉 is
an abstract vector that appears as a wave function if we write it in a spatial basis.
But why does an observer, who arises as a certain part of the state vector, see his
“world” of “objects” layed out in a space which corresponds to this specific basis?
(Here, “part” means something like a factor in a certain branch of |Ψ〉, possibly after
“tracing out” practically inaccessible degrees of freedom of the environment. I will
not discuss the possible complications in defining an observer in the EI, because it
is not the main concern here. For example, “tracing out” implies that one considers
a density operator instead of a state vector, i.e. the observer is involved in some
kind of ensemble picture, which I want to avoid here.)
In fact, there are infinitely many different spaces that can serve as a basis. (When I
say a space “serves as a basis” I mean that all vectors of the Hilbert space are writ-
ten as wave functions in n copies of that space, where n is the number of particles).
Consider the case n = 1, and two orthogonal state vectors |e1〉 and |e2〉 of norm
1. Written as wave functions in some “x-space” (in which H takes a particularly
simple and symmetric form), we may have
〈x|e1〉 = f1(x), 〈x|e2〉 = f2(x) (8)
where f1,2 are specific functions which are orthogonal to each other. We may define
a new space, “y-space” via
〈y|e1〉 = f2(y), 〈y|e2〉 = f1(y), (9)
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and for all vectors |ei〉 which are orthogonal to |e1〉 and |e2〉, we define
〈y|ei〉 = 〈x = y|ei〉, (10)
where 〈x = y| is the (pseudo-)vector for which x has the same value as y on the
left hand side of the equation. That is, in y-space the roles of |e1〉 and |e2〉 are
exchanged. In terms of x-space, the vector |e1〉 represents the function f1; in terms
of y-space, the same vector represents the function f2, and vice versa for |e2〉. For
all vectors orthogonal to |e1〉 and |e2〉, the corresponding functions are the same in
both spaces. This is always possible because there must be a unitary transformation
which exchanges |e1〉 and |e2〉 and leaves all vectors orthogonal to them invariant.
The relations (9) and (10) define the new space. The two spaces are totally different.
You don’t get y-space by simply moving around some points of x-space. And yet we
can write |Ψ〉 as a wave function in x-space or in y-space, and there is no reason why
|Ψ〉 should look simpler in x-space than in y-space. (This is well known for x-space
versus k-space, the Fourier transformed space. This is just a reminder that there
is an infinity of such spaces.) The Hamilton operator will look very unpleasant in
y-space. The position operator X looks nice in x-space and unpleasant in y-space.
The position operator Y looks nice in y-space and unpleasant in x-space, etc.
So, the question is: Why do we appear to live in the space in which the Hamilton
operator looks particularly simple? Does the time evolution of |Ψ〉, induced by this
Hamilton operator, also have particularly nice properties if expressed in that space?
(We will see that this is not the case.)
In quantum field theory (QFT) things are more complicated, but not qualitatively
different. The Hamilton operator is construcuted as an integral over operators
(operator-valued distributions) which are local with respect to some x-space. So,
x-space takes part in the construction of H . But we can refer to H as an abstract
hermitean operator acting on the global Hilbert space, without refering to how it
was constructed. Again, H may take on its simplest form if it is written in terms
of such an integral. But again the question is why an observer, arising as some part
of the global state vector, “sees” this particular space over which the integrals run.
The question of how space arises can be considered a part of the factorization prob-
lem. If the distinguished factorization is such that the Hamilton operators Hi of the
subsystems Si still have their simplest form if written in x-space (i.e. as operators
acting on wave functions in x-space), and the interaction Hamiltonian Hint between
the subsystems describes interactions local in x-space, then we have a good reason
to consider x-space as distinguished.
There are more complications, for example how to identify the x-spaces of the sub-
systems with each other. In what sense can we say that the x-space in which S1 is
expressed is the “same” space as the x-space in which S2 is expressed? Intuitively
it seems reasonable that the answer is somehow contained in the local interaction
again. The interaction gets strong when the x-value of S1 gets close to the x-value
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of S2 (if both S1 and S2 are in states such that their wave functions are narrow in
x-space, so that we can speak of an “x-value of S1,2”). In that sense we may say
that S1 gets “close” to S2. Again, I will not go any deeper here.
• Classicality:
Why do the “objects”, in particular if they are macroscopic, appear to have classical
properties? I.e., why don’t we see any superpositions, objects smeared out in space
etc? These questions can be asked only if the previous issues have been resolved,
so we know what the objects are and what space is. But then these particular
questions are resolved by decoherence. The interactions carry the superpositions of
an object into the environment via entanglement, such that the superposition is,
after a short time of interaction, a global superposition, i.e. a branching structure
of the global state vector, instead of a local superposition just within the object.
Within a branch, the object appears to have classical properties, in the sense that
the properties which are distinguishable through the interactions have definite values
within a branch.
• Measurement:
How does the second postulate of QM emerge from 1 and 3? This is also resolved
by decoherence. A measurement is a controlled interaction between a measuring
device M and a system S. The interaction is such that a certain property of S
is distinguished, i.e. the different components of |ΨS〉 with respect to a specific
basis of HS have a different impact on M . This leads to a branching of the global
state vector where in each branch only one component of |ΨS〉 survives. Together
with the value shown by the pointer of M this gives an observer (who lives in one
branch) the impression he has projected |ΨS〉 with a specific hermitean operator.
The appearance of probabilities is still under discussion, but as mentioned in the
introduction a reasonable solution exists.
From the discussion in this section we may conclude that the EI is a reasonable and
elegant framework for QM as soon as we can solve the factorization problem.
3 The state vector of the universe
The factorization problem with all its implications, as described in the previous section,
looks quite complicated. The solution is remarkably simple: Nothing of all this happens
in the EI.
We have only two fundamental entities at hand: the state vector of the universe |Ψ〉,
and the Hamilton operator H . We assume H to be not explicitly time-dependent, because
a time-dependent H is hard to reconcile with the symmetries of special or general relativ-
ity, or with a global energy conservation. We may forget about how H was constructed
and consider it just as an abstract hermitean operator acting on H, the space in which |Ψ〉
lives. The time evolution of |Ψ〉 takes the simplest form in the basis where H is diagonal,
|Ψ(t)〉 =∑ cne−iEnt|n〉, (11)
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where |n〉 are the eigenvectors and En the corresponding eigenvalues (for simplicity we
assume a discrete spectrum). Each component of |Ψ〉 peacefully performs its phase rota-
tions. In this form, it seems hard to believe that |Ψ〉 describes interacting subsystems.
Yes, H was constructed as the operator of “energy” present in some interacting particles
or fields. But how are these interactions represented in |Ψ〉? Not at all. At least not
when we look at it in this simple form.
Now let’s discuss factorizations into subsystems. One may ask why the “peaceful”
state (11) should be factorized at all. Let’s ignore the why-question and just do it. How-
ever, when we do it, we should look for factorizations as simple as possible. If we find a
“Nirvana factorization”, according to which nothing happens, we should prefer it as com-
pared to a “Samsara factorization”, according to which it seems like something happens;
just as the Minkowski metric (3) should be considered more “appropriate” than (4). That
is because a Samsara frame constitutes an arbitrary and unnecessary complication. Of
course, both metrics (3) and (4) are correct. But if we ask: “Is Minkowski space associated
with the prediction of an expanding universe?”, the answer should be no. Similarly, if we
find a Nirvana frame for |Ψ〉, we can no longer claim that the EI predicts a universe in
which subsystems interact and entangle with each other.
I will divide the following discussion into two parts: At first I will consider only time-
independent factorizations of Hilbert space, then also time-dependent ones. As I discussed
in the previous section, I think the second option is fine, but some people may be more
conservative.
If a factorization has to be time-independent, one can proceed in two steps: At first
one may look for a decomposition in which the subsystems don’t interact at all, i.e. the
Hamilton operator can be written as
H = H1 ⊗ 1⊗ 1+ 1⊗H2 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ 1⊗H3 + · · · (12)
This is the case if all eigenvalues En can be written in the form
En = E
(1)
i + E
(2)
j + E
(3)
k + · · · (13)
for some index sets I, J , etc., i ∈ I, j ∈ J , etc., such that all combinations E(1)i +E(2)j +
E
(3)
k + · · · occur in the spectrum of H , with the correct degeneracies. (If the dimension
of H is a finite number d, the product of the cardinalities of I, J , etc. must be d.) Then
we may relabel
|n〉 = |ijk · · ·〉, (14)
take this as the factorization basis,
|ijk · · ·〉 = |i〉 ⊗ |j〉 ⊗ |k〉 · · · , (15)
and interpret the E
(α)
i as the energy eigenvalues of the subsystems Sα. This is a Nirvana
factorization, there is no interaction between the subsystems, and nothing happens except
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phase rotations for each energy component, in each subsystem independently.
If such a decomposition does not exist, we may still relabel the {|n〉} in multiindex
form, as in (14), but this time in an arbitrary way (consistent with the dimension of H, if
that is finite), and use this as the factorization basis, as in (15). Now, there are interactions
between the such defined subsystems. But their only effect is to cause different speeds for
the phase rotations of the branches: The time evolution of |Ψ〉 reads now
|Ψ(t)〉 =∑ cij···e−iEn(ij···)t|i〉 ⊗ |j〉 ⊗ · · · (16)
Each term in this sum can be interpreted as a branch of the world, according to the chosen
factorization. But all branches are there right from the beginning, they are not due to
some entanglement that happens in a physical process. Each branch peacefully rotates
with its frequency En(ij···), and nothing else happens. Therefore, we can still consider this
a Nirvana frame.
If one allows time-dependent factorizations (and I think this is what one should
do), the situation becomes even simpler. Now we don’t even have to assume that H is
time-independent, and we don’t need to work with a discrete spectrum to keep things
simple. We may just choose a time-dependent basis vector |e1(t)〉 which absorbs the time
evolution of |Ψ(t)〉,
|e1(t)〉 = |Ψ(t)〉. (17)
This means, we effectively move to the Heisenberg picture. If we take |e1(t)〉 as part of a
factorization basis (the rest of the basis is irrelevant), i.e.
|e1(t)〉 = |f1〉 ⊗ |g1〉 ⊗ · · · , (18)
we have a real Nirvana factorization: In the subsystems according to this factorization,
nothing happens at all, not even phase rotations. Each subsystem is in an eigenstate with
respect to its “apparent” Hamilton operator, with eigenvalue zero. There are no branches
and no interactions, |Ψ(t)〉 is once and for all given by the tensor product (18).
This simple choice is possible due to two facts: (a) All state vectors of norm 1 are
equivalent, there is no structure available in the Hilbert space which distinguishes |Ψ〉
from any other state vector. It makes a difference with respect to H , but who cares?
Nobody is ever going to make a measurement on |Ψ〉 using H (measure the “energy of
the universe”). Instead, the EI assumes that everything follows from “inside” |Ψ〉 and its
time evolution. Yes, different |Ψ〉s have different time evolutions. But: (b) Since we have
no other guiding principle how to choose subsystems of H, we can just choose them such
that they absorb this time evolution for the given |Ψ〉 in the most trivial way.
This is a fundamental property of Quantum Mechanics: The state vector per se does
not contain any information at all. The information arises only when a state is measured
using a specific operator. The presence of “information” or “structure” requires both,
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the state vector and the operator. Here, “measured” can be understood either in the
“mystical” sense of the Copenhagen Interpretation, or in the sense of entanglement +
decoherence. In any case, there must be an environment to which the state vector really
represents a state. For the state vector of the universe, there is no such environment.
The tensor product structure of Hilbert space is usually only considered bottom-up,
not top-down. That is, one starts from a given product structure (system, environment)
and given interactions, and computes the time evolution of this product structure. The
combined state vector is always written as a vector in a tensor product of the subsystem
Hilbert spaces. But for the EI to make sense, we have to go the other way: we have
to start from the combined Hilbert space and factorize it in a meaningful way such that
interacting subsystems emerge. In this section I have demonstrated that this does not
work, or more precisely: We can factorize it into interacting subsystem, but the way to
do this is unnecessarily complicated and completely arbitrary. In the next section I will
discuss the bottom-up versus top-down problem by the means of a simple example.
4 The measurement process bottom-up and top-down
We base our discussion on an idealized simple measurement process. Consider a sys-
tem S2 consisting of a measurement device M and an object to be measured, S1, with
corresponding Hilbert space
HS2 = HM ⊗HS1. (19)
For simplicity, we take HS1 to be two-dimensional and HM three-dimensional. We denote
the basis vectors of HS1 in which the measurement is diagonal | ↑〉 and | ↓〉. Before the
measurement, M is in the state |0〉. After the measurement, M will be in the state |+〉
if S1 is in the state | ↑〉, or |−〉 if S1 is in the state | ↓〉. Here, |0〉, |+〉 and |−〉 are
orthogonal and can be thought of as pointer positions of the measurement device: |+〉
indicates that | ↑〉 has been measured, |−〉 indicates that | ↓〉 has been measured.
According to the Everett interpretation, the whole measurement process can be de-
scribed by the unitary evolution induced by the Hamilton operator H acting on the
six-dimensional space HS2. That is, H contains an interaction term between M and S1
which lets an initial state |0〉 ⊗ | ↑〉 evolve into |+〉 ⊗ | ↑〉, and similarly for | ↓〉:
|Ψ〉before = |0〉 ⊗ | ↑〉 −→ |Ψ〉after = |+〉 ⊗ | ↑〉 (20)
|Ψ〉before = |0〉 ⊗ | ↓〉 −→ |Ψ〉after = |−〉 ⊗ | ↓〉 (21)
For simplicity we assume that
• the interaction is switched on at a time tbefore and switched off at tafter
• |Ψ〉before is constant before tbefore
• |Ψ〉after is constant after tafter
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• The interaction is constant between tbefore and tafter, so |Ψ〉before gets smoothly ro-
tated into |Ψ〉after.
If we ascribe values to the pointer states |+〉 and |−〉, say +1 and −1, then this time
evolution generates the picture that M has “acted on S1” with a hermitean operator
which in the chosen basis of HS1 has the matrix form σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. This operator is
a derived property of the process.
The superposition principle tells us that for an initial S1-state 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉) the time
evolution is
|Ψ〉before = 1√
2
|0〉 ⊗ (| ↑〉+ | ↓〉) −→ |Ψ〉after = 1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ | ↑〉+ |−〉 ⊗ | ↓〉) (22)
Written in this form, the time evolution of |Ψ〉 tells a Samsara story: The object S1 en-
tangles with the measurement device, thereby splitting |Ψ〉 into two branches; one branch
with measurement result +1, one with result −1.
We may choose the following orthonormal basis for HS2:
|e1〉 = |0〉 ⊗ | ↑〉, |e2〉 = |0〉 ⊗ | ↓〉, |e3〉 = |+〉 ⊗ | ↑〉, (23)
|e4〉 = |+〉 ⊗ | ↓〉, |e5〉 = |−〉 ⊗ | ↑〉, |e6〉 = |−〉 ⊗ | ↓〉. (24)
Written in components according to this basis, the evolution given in (22) becomes
(
1√
2
,
1√
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0) −→ (0, 0, 1√
2
, 0, 0,
1√
2
) (25)
Now we define
|e′1〉 =
1
2
(|e1〉+ |e2〉+ |e3〉+ |e6〉) (26)
|e′2〉 =
1
2
(|e1〉+ |e2〉 − |e3〉 − |e6〉) (27)
These two vectors can be completed by four other vectors to form another orthonormal
basis of HS2. (The choice of the four other basis vectors is arbitrary, as long as they are
orthonormal to the first two, because |Ψ〉 has no components in their direction.) In this
new basis, the time evolution in (22) becomes
(
1√
2
,
1√
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0) −→ ( 1√
2
,− 1√
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0). (28)
The story told by this encryption of |Ψ〉 is a Nirvana story: |Ψ〉 is a sum of two compo-
nents. One of them is unchanged after the process, the other one acquires only a phase
exp(ipi). There is no sign of any interaction or entanglement in this basis.
What happened? With the new basis we left the original picture of the six-dimensional
Hilbert space HS2 being obtained from a tensor product. We considered it a space on its
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own right, without reference to the tensor decomposition HM ⊗ HS1 it was constructed
from. This is in accordance with the Everett interpretation, where the larger Hilbert
space is always more fundamental, and a meaningful tensor factorization should emerge
from the dynamics in that larger Hilbert space. Then we constructed a basis in which
the unitary time evolution operator U(tafter, tbefore) is diagonal. In this basis the time
evolution consists only of phase rotations of each component.
There are infinitely many possibilities to factorize a six-dimensional Hilbert space into
the tensor product of a two- and a three-dimensional Hilbert space. Each six-dimensional
basis can serve as a starting point to factorize the basis vectors similarly as in (23). For
example, if we use |e′1〉, |e′2〉, · · · as a starting point, we may factorize
HS2 = HM ′ ⊗HS1′ (29)
by writing
|e′1〉 = |0′〉 ⊗ | ↑′〉, |e′2〉 = |0′〉 ⊗ | ↓′〉 (30)
etc., which turns the evolution (22) into
1√
2
|0′〉 ⊗ (| ↑′〉+ | ↓′〉) −→ 1√
2
|0′〉 ⊗ (| ↑′〉 − | ↓′〉) (31)
No entanglement, no measurement takes place in this decomposition; the phase rotation
of the | ↓′〉 component is internal to S2′ and can be considered as being due to an S2′-
internal Hamilton operator HS2′. And yet it is exactly the same time evolution as in (22),
only written in a different factorization of HS2.
The “Nirvana factorization” (29) tells a simpler story than the “Samsara factorization”
(19). Why would one still choose the factorization (19) over (29)? The reason is, of course,
that an external observer O may be able to “read off” M , but not M ′ (fortunately, since
M ′ wouldn’t tell him anything but “Nothing happened”). That is, he makes himself a
“measurement” (observation) which operates on HM , not on HM ′ . The way in which the
observer interacts with the system S2 sets a preference for
• the tensor decomposition (19), i.e. he sees the measurement device M as a distinct
object;
• the choice of basis for HM , i.e. he sees the state of M as a choice between specific
pointer positions.
Only due to this specific interaction with an observer outside of S2 the Samsara story of
a measurement taking place becomes meaningful.
The problem is: We can play the same game again. According to the Everett inter-
pretation, this new interaction can again be described by the unitatry evolution of a state
vector in a larger Hilbert space HS3, which is the tensor product of HS2 and the Hilbert
space HO in which the observer “lives”,
HS3 = HO ⊗HS2. (32)
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The story given by this description is that of an observer entangling with the system S2,
splitting into a branch where the observer sees the measurement device in position |+〉
and another branch where he sees the measurement device in position |−〉.
Again, however, there is a basis of the combined Hilbert space HS3 in which the uni-
tary time evolution is diagonal. In this basis, nothing happens apart from phase rotations
of some components. Applying the same argument as before, we see that the “Samsara
factorization” into an observer and the System S2 is a bad choice, because the according
tensor split of the Hilbert space tells an unnecessarily complicated story.
We can go on like this, arguing that the system S3 again interacts with its environ-
ment, in particular with other observers, who see the first observer O as a separate entity,
thereby favoring the original factorization. But at some point, we reach the state vector
of the universe. Now there is no external interaction, no external observer anymore. At
this point, there is no valid argument anymore why a Samsara factorization should be
preferred, and the arguments of section 3 apply.
Some remarks:
1. A Nirvana factorization of S3 can be obtained in analogy with S2: Let |Φ〉before and
|Φ〉after be the S3-states before and after both the measurement has been performed and
the observer has read off the result. Then define
|α〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ〉before + |Φ〉after), |β〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ〉before − |Φ〉after). (33)
Since |Φ〉after is orthogonal to |Φ〉before (the state of M after the measurement has no
overlap with the state before the measurement), we can take |α〉 and |β〉 as part of an
orthonormal basis, and in this basis the time evolution is exactly as in (28), and we may
factorize S3 according to this basis.
In a less idealized measurement, without a definite tbefore/after where the interaction is
turned on/off, and without perfectly orthogonal |Φ〉before/after, this way to define a Nirvana
factorization does not work anymore. Instead, one has to follow the methods outlined in
section 3.
2. Deutsch [3] has noticed the factorization problem and suggested a solution. He argued
that if a measurement has taken place, there is a unique factorization in which certain
nice properties hold for the subsystems M and S1; in particular, the time evolution looks
like (22) in this factorization. Since there is only one such factorization, the factorization
problem is solved, he claims. The flaws in his argument have already been demonstrated
on a rather technical level in [10]. Now we see there is a really fundamental problem with
his argument: The mere fact that a measurement (or an interaction) has taken
place is already a property of the factorization, not of the state evolution.
Deutsch erroneously considered the happening of a measurement a frame-independent
property of the state evolution, and therefore suggested to look for a factorization which
shows the entanglement most clearly.
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3. The change from a factorization which shows interaction / entanglement into a fac-
torization without interactions is applied in one very basic example of QM: the hydrogen
atom. (The connection with our more global factorization problem has been pointed out
already in [11].) The proton and electron interact with each other and make the hydrogen
atom a two-body problem. It is, however, possible to disentangle the system into two
independent one-body problems: one free system, given by a wave function of the center
of mass position, ψcm(xcm, t), and one system given by a wave function of the relative
position of proton and electron, ψrel(xrel, t), residing in a Coulomb potential. There is
no interaction term between these two wave functions. This example is analogous to the
disentanglement of the measurement process demonstrated in this section.
5 Conclusions
I have shown that it is always possible to factorize the global Hilbert space into subsystems
in such a way, that the story told by this factorization is that of a world in which nothing
happens. A factorization into interacting and entangling subsystems is also possible, in
infinitely many arbitrary ways. But such a more complicated factorization is meaningful
only if it is justified through interactions with an external observer who does not arise as
a part of the state vector.
The Many World Interpretation is therefore rather a No World Interpretation (accord-
ing to the simple factorization), or a Many Many Worlds Interpretation (because each of
the arbitrary more complicated factorizations tells a different story about Many Worlds
[7]).
We can say that the state vector of QM per se does not contain any information or
substructure. The state vectors of norm 1 are all equivalent, because the scalar product
is the only internal structure of a Hilbert space. Information arises only when a preferred
basis is somehow singled out, according to which the state of the system can be written
in components. (A part of the choice of basis is the choice of factorization, the split of the
system into subsystems, which gives it an internal structure.) The information is then
contained in the relation of the state to the basis, not in the state alone. The notion of
information or structure which arises from this view is interesting and requires further
discussion. Information or structure in this sense is not contained in an object, but only
in the object’s relation to a receptor, or more precisely: the object’s relation to the way
in which the receptor looks at the object. Another example in a very different context is
discussed in section 6.2.
The state vector of the universe in the EI has no environment or observer it can relate
to, and is therefore completely meaningless. The appearance of interacting subsystems of
the universe are only due to a choice of a “samsara” basis, which is however completely
arbitrary, just like a slicing of Minkowski spacetime is possible, which makes it look like
an expanding universe (cf eq.4).
One has to add something to give the state vector and QM a meaning. First one can
mention several things that will not help to solve the factorization problem:
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1. Dynamical Collapse [12]: This is a modification of the Schro¨dinger equation to single
out one of the “many worlds” dynamically. This has nothing to do with our concerns
here and is not helpful at all. It leads only to a change of the time evolution of the state
vector, which can again be absorbed by a comoving basis. The factorization problem is
unaffected.
2. Postulation of spacetime: If spacetime is postulated as an additional entity, it becomes
“natural” to construct the Hamilton operator from operators acting locally in space. But
an observer would still have to arise from a substructure of the state vector (we didn’t
postulate any additional objects in spacetime, only spacetime itself), and here is the prob-
lem: As discussed in sections 2 and 3, the state vector doesn’t “see” the space that went
into the construction of the Hamilton operator. The factorization problem remains.
3. Dualistic interpretations of QM which emphasize the role of “minds”, like “Many
Minds” [13, 14], or like interpretations which make mind responsible for a collapse of the
state vector [15, 16]. In this case it is the burden of the minds to see the world according
to a certain factorization. But since the state vector does not contain any structure at
all, such an approach shifts all structure completely into the minds, or their reception of /
interaction with the state vector, or the way in which the state vector guides the minds,
or whatever is the appropriate terminology in a specific interpretation. I.e. all structure
is pushed outside of what is in reach for scientific analysis. This cannot be regarded a
meaningful solution.
There are several possibilities to avoid the factorization problem:
• Pilot wave theory (PWT), also known as Bohm theory [17, 18]: Particles moving
in spacetime are added to the theory. I.e. a spacetime is postulated, and in addition
particles moving in this spacetime are postulated. “Observers” consist of these
particles, not of substructures of the state vector. The particles are “guided” by the
state vector. Pilot wave theory has been criticized by EI proponents as unnecessary:
The many worlds of the EI are also present here within the state vector, and the
particles serve only as “pointers” to one of these worlds [19].
But now we see that PWT solves the main problems discussed here: The particles
define a meaningful factorization of the global Hilbert space (they are by definition
the “objects”, i.e. subsystems of the universe), and a position space that serves as
a preferred basis. The state vector is defined as a wave function in a configuration
space corresponding to particle positions. The feature of the PWT, that it brings a
preferred basis into the theory, is not a weakness, it is a strength. It remains to be
seen, however, how well PWT can be adapted to a quantum theory as complicated
as the Standard Model of Particle Physics.
• Copenhagen Interpretation (CI): The CI is actually a statement about science.
The world as far as it can be described by science must be split into a realm of
phenomena and a realm of modeling. The realm of phenomena contains subjects
making observations on objects, and the objects are described in a “classical way”
(on a first layer of modeling), i.e. with definite properties, and localized in spacetime.
The realm of modeling (actually: the second layer of modeling) is a mathematical
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structure (here: a Hilbert space) whose only purpose is to make predictions about
the phenomena. It does not have an independent existence, and therefore there is
no factorization problem. The question why there is a certain relation between the
model and the phenomena, i.e. why the model actually predicts the phenomena,
cannot be solved by science. The CI was often criticized as unclear and anti-realist.
But one can also see it as a positive way to deal with the limitations of science.
As an approach which accepts these limitations, and which makes the distinction
between a model to describe phenomena and a model to predict phenomena (or
their statistics) explicit; More comments on the CI and its relation to the EI follow
in section 6.4.
• QM as an effective theory: QM is only a limit of a more fundamental theory.
The state vector is therefore only an emergent object, not a fundamental one [20].
The appearance of interacting objects must be explained in the fundamental theory,
not from the state vector.
6 Connections to other topics and Outlook
6.1 Epistemic versus ontic state
There is an ongoing discussion whether the state vector has “ontic” or “epistemic” charac-
ter, where, roughly speaking, “ontic” means it is a real thing “out there”, and “epistemic”
means it is just an effective way to charactarize an observer’s subjective state of knowledge
about a system.
One year ago, Pusey et al published a paper [21] which showed that certain interpre-
tations treating the state vector as epistemic are inconsistent. (In particular, they showed
that it is not possible to have a “real physical state” that is consistent with several quan-
tum states, such that each of these quantum states can be interpreted as representing
some subjective knowledge about the real state.) Here I have shown that the state vector
also cannot be ontic, if “ontic” implies that it can stand by itself, without a relation to
other objects or observers.
The strange hybrid character of the state vector comes from the fact that it makes sense
only in relation to a measurement. On the other hand, it can describe the measurement
process as part of itself, but only if the result is subjected to another measurement (as
shown in section 4). I will come back to the strange double role of measurement in section
6.4.
In my opinion, the whole notion of ontology and its relation to science should be
rediscussed with a fresh attitude. I will present some ideas in that direction in a separate
paper.
6.2 Story of a Brain
An argument very similar to the one presented here has been given by Zuboff in his
Story of a brain [22] to reject certain theories about how subjective experience arises
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from brain states. These theories contained certain assumptions about which aspects
of the brain states are irrelevant to the generated experience. From these assumptions
Zuboff constructed transformations of the geometry and sequence of the firing / non-
firing neurons, which should leave the experience unaffected. He was able to combine
the transformations in such a way that finally the “brain” consisted of only one neuron
which fires one single time. He concluded that if these theories were right, every possible
subjective experience would be contained already in a single firing neuron. Hence these
theories are inconsistent.
The analogy with the present argument is obvious. Zuboff’s transformations corre-
spond to the basis transformations in QM. Then it turns out there is a basis in which the
state appears trivial, i.e. strucutureless. Therefore, the state is trivial and cannot explain
(or is in contradiction with) the complicated patterns seen in the universe / in subjective
experience.
It is instructive to see how Hofstadter and Dennett try to refute Zuboff’s argument
(they are proponents of these theories he has taken ad absurdum): They argue, if Zuboff’s
argument were right, one could also say that the entire information contained in all the
books of the world are already contained in printing each letter from A to Z one single
time.
But here is exactly the difference I have discussed in the context of QM: The books in
the libraries are read by external observers. These observers read the books according to
a specific basis: They read every line from left to right, each page from top to bottom etc.
The books contain their information with respect to that “basis”, and therefore printing
each letter a single time is insufficient, because the corresponding “basis transformation”
is not allowed. The flickering of the neurons, on the other hand, should lead to subjective
experience per se, without the help of an external observer, and therefore without a
preferred “basis”. Therefore, Zuboff is right, and Dennett and Hofstadter are wrong.
6.3 Is the world a mathematical structure?
Tegmark has argued convincingly that science reduces the world to a mathematical struc-
ture [23, 24, 25]. I.e., the picture of the world that is created by science is a mathematical
structure. In particular, in science it doesn’t make sense to make a distinction between
the structure and entities described by the structure, because there is nothing that science
could say about such entities except for what is already contained in the structure.
Tegmark’s view is clearly that this picture created by science is complete, i.e. the
mathematical strucuture can stand on its own ground and is the world (or the multiverse)
in which we live and are a part of.
This view is challenged by the argument I have given here. If we take QM in the EI,
the mathematical structure is the state vector and its time evolution. This structure has
actually turned out to be empty if it stands on its own. It becomes a nontrivial structure
only in relation to an external observer, or through the interaction with an environment
which is not part of the state vector already.
PWT doesn’t seem to have this problem at first glance. The structure is now given by
the state vector and the particle trajectories. But if we take the mathematical universe
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serious, on a fundamental level we shouldn’t even speak of particles as entities separate
from the mathematical structure. There are only the trajectories, and it is a pure lan-
guage convention to assign them to entities called particles. So, the trajectories form a set
of 3n real-valued functions of time (where n is the number of particles). What kinds of
transformations should we allow on the 3n functions and claim that these transformations
don’t change the structure, or don’t change the “information” contained in the structure?
Why should we consider the 3n functions as trajectories of n particles in 3 dimensions and
not, say, of 3 particles in n dimensions? I.e. how is our observation of a 3-dimensional
space filled with objects reflected in the “structure” of trajectories? It seems to me that
we run into problems similar to the EI, and that the following statement is fundamental:
A structure is a structure only with respect to some observer or environment outside
the structure who reads off the structure as a structure in a specific way.
This statement requires further discussion and justification. At the moment one can
say that the only interpretation of QM which has this statement built in is the CI.
6.4 Schro¨dinger’s Problem
In [26], Schro¨dinger writes:
“The thing that bewilders us is the curious double role that the conscious mind ac-
quires. On the one hand it is the stage, and the only stage on which this whole world-
process takes place, or the vessel or container that contains it all and outside which there
is nothing. On the other hand we gather the impression, maybe the deceptive impression,
that within this world-bustle the conscious mind is tied up with certain very particular
organs (brains), which [...] serve after all only to maintain the lives of their owners, and
it is only to this that they owe their having been elaborated in the process of speciation
by natural selection.”
Schro¨dinger compares the situation with an artist who places a picture of himself as
an inconsiderable minor character in one of his paintings. This seems to him the best al-
legory for the confusing double role of mind. On the one hand it is the artist who created
everything; in the completed work, however, it is only an unimportant decoration which
could have been left out without changing the total impression substantially.
The text is part of Schro¨dinger’s philosophical work, at that time totally unrelated
to QM. But now we see that the situation in QM is similar, if we replace “mind” by
“measurement”: In the CI, the measurement is central. It is the only stage on which
the whole physics-bustle takes place, and the state vector is justified only as a model
to predict the statistics of measurement results, with no independent existence. In the
EI, the measurement process is just a little interaction process like many others, and is
completely included in the picture of the state vector, as a “minor character” that could
be missing without changing the picture substantially. This is the strange double role of
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the measurement.
It seems that one of these views alone cannot survive. If the CI is taken alone, one may
respond: “But why should we mystify the measurement? I can model the measurement
inside QM, as a part of the unitary evolution of the state vector, without giving it such
a fundamental role.” If, on the other hand, the EI is taken alone, we have seen that the
resulting picture is not a picture anymore. It is an empty nothing. Only together, as
complementary views on QM, the CI and EI make sense.
The strange double role of the measurement, just as the strange double role of the
mind, is a problem most fundamentally related to what we do when we do science. We
create a picture of objects; a picture created by subjects. The double role is fundamentally
built into science. I conjecture it cannot be resolved within science.
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